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The Louisiana DOMA as an Improper Impediment to
the Evolution of Public Policy Toward Cohabitants
I. INTRODUCTION
Some people just do not want to get married. In fact, more and
more Americans are choosing not to do so, opting instead to live
together without walking down the aisle.1 As of the 2000 Census,
there were nearly 5.5 million households in the United States headed
by an unmarried partner.2 Of those households, more than 4.8
million were headed by an opposite-sex unmarried partner.3
Social acceptance of unmarried couples in long-term
relationships has increased in the last 20 years.4 Public attitudes
toward celebrity lifestyles are often indicative of a broader approval
or disapproval of the lifestyle in general. Some famous couples have
chosen not to marry yet have remained devoted to one another for
decades and raised families together. Kurt Russell and Goldie
Hawn, for instance, are both successful actors who have been
together for more than 25 years without getting married.5 The two
have a son, along with other children from previous marriages.6
When asked why she and Russell never married, Hawn replied,
“Because we have done just perfectly without marrying . . . . I
already feel devoted and isn’t that what marriage is supposed to do?
So as long as my emotional state is in a state of devotion, honesty,
caring and loving, then we’re fine.”7 Although there is some debate
Copyright 2012, by RANDY J. MARSE, JR.
1. T.P. Gallanis, Inheritance Rights for Domestic Partners, 79 TUL. L. REV.
55, 59 (2004) (citing Larry L. Bumpass & James A. Sweet, Cohabitation,
Marriage and Union Stability: Preliminary Findings from NSFH2 at tbl. 2 (Nat’l
Survey of Families and Households, Working Paper No. 65, May 1995)).
2. TAVIA SIMMONS & MARTIN O'CONNELL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
MARRIED COUPLE AND UNMARRIED PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000, CENSUS 2000
SPECIAL REPORT 4 tbl. 2 (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2003pubs/censr-5.pdf.
3. Id.
4. Gallanis, supra note 1, at 58.
5. Goldie Hawn and Kurt Russell prove their 25-year romance is still going
strong on holiday in Croatia, THE DAILY MAIL ONLINE, (June 17, 2010, 8:22 PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-1287435/Goldie-Hawn-Kurt-Rus
sell-prove-25-year-romance-going-strong-holiday-Croatia.html#ixzz11huplXgn.
6. See Goldie Hawn Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM, http://www.biography.
com/articles/Goldie-Hawn-9331873 (last visited Nov. 9, 2010).
7. Anythinghollywood, Hollywood’s Golden Couple, Goldie Hawn and Kurt
Russell, ZIMBIO.COM (Mar. 8, 2009, 4:33 AM), http://www.zimbio.com/Goldie+

790

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

about whether living together outside of marriage is an acceptable
social practice, such relationships have undeniably become more
common. As Letitia Baldridge noted over 30 years ago, “It used to
be called living in sin . . . but it has become, by weight of sheer
statistics, a way of life. We must therefore cope with it as such.”8
Americans choose not to marry for various reasons. The
American Law Institute articulated a few such reasons in its
“Principles of the Law on Family Dissolution”:
Among other [reasons], some [couples] have been unhappy
in prior marriages and therefore wish to avoid the form of
marriage even as they enjoy its substance. . . . Some begin a
casual relationship that develops slowly into a durable union,
by which time a formal marriage ceremony may seem
awkward . . . . Failure to marry may reflect group mores;
some ethnic and social groups have a substantially lower
incidence of marriage and a substantially higher incidence of
informal domestic relationships than do others. Failure to
marry may also reflect strong social or economic inequality
between the partners, which allows the stronger partner to
resist the weaker partner’s preference for marriage. . . . In all
these cases, the absence of formal marriage may have little
or no bearing on the character of the parties’ domestic
relationship . . . .9
No matter what reason a couple chooses not to marry, society
now recognizes such relationships and the law should do so as well.
Scholars have long debated the legal rights and protections that
should be afforded to couples choosing not to enter into the marital
relationship.10 Any rights and protections that exist for such couples,
which vary from state to state, were threatened in the aftermath of

Hawn/articles/69/Hollywood+Golden+Couple+Goldie+Hawn+Kurt+Russell (last
visited February 22, 2012).
8. THE AMY VANDERBILT COMPLETE BOOK OF ETIQUETTE 128 (L.
Baldridge ed., 1978).
9. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, § 6.02 cmt. a (2002).
10. See generally Gallanis, supra note 1, at 59; Kathryn Venturatos Lorio,
Concubinage and its Alternatives: A Proposal for a More Perfect Union, 26 LOY.
L. REV. 1 (1980).

2012]

COMMENT

791

the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health.11 In Goodridge, the court held that
denying a same-sex couple’s right to marriage violated the
Massachusetts Constitution.12 In response, 30 states have adopted a
“Defense of Marriage Amendment” (“DOMA”) to amend their
constitutions and prevent a similar decision granting same-sex
couples the right to marry.13
Many of these DOMAs also affect the rights of opposite-sex
couples. Fifteen DOMAs, including Louisiana’s, prohibit a legal
status “identical or substantially similar” to marriage for all
unmarried persons, including opposite-sex couples as well as samesex partners.14 In several of these states, legal authorities analyzed
the amendment and determined its effect upon unmarried oppositesex couples (“cohabitants”).15 Although in 2004 the Louisiana
legislature debated the effect its DOMA would have, the issue
remains unresolved.16
Compounding the uncertainty as to the application of DOMA to
cohabitants in Louisiana is the State’s history of legislative
11. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
12. Id.
13. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03; ARIZ. CONST. art. XXX, § 1; ARK.
CONST. amend. 83, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; CO. CONST. art. 2, § 31; FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 27; GA. CONST. art. I, § 4, ¶ I; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23; IDAHO
CONST. art. III, § 28; KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16; KY. CONST. § 233A; LA. CONST.
art. XII, § 15; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25; MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 263A; MO.
CONST. art. I, § 33; MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29; NEV.
CONST. art. I, § 21; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11; OKLA.
CONST. art. II, § 35; OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a; S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15; S.D.
CONST. art. XXI, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 29; VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A; WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13.
14. These fifteen DOMAs are those of: Arkansas, ARK. CONST. art. I, § 25;
Florida, FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27; Kansas, KAN CONST. art. XV, § 16; Kentucky,
KY. CONST. § 233A; Louisiana, LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15; Michigan, MICH.
CONST. art. I, § 25; North Dakota, N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; Ohio, OHIO CONST.
art. XV, § 11; Oklahoma, OK. CONST. art. II, § 35; South Carolina, S.C. CONST.
art. XVIII, § 15; South Dakota, S.D. CONST. art. XXI, § 9; Texas, TEX. CONST. art.
I, § 32; Utah, UTAH. CONST. art. I, § 29; Virginia, VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A;
Wisconsin, WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13.
15. See National Pride at Work, Inc. v. Gov. of Michigan, 748 N.W.2d 524
(Mich. 2008); Ross v. Goldstein, 203 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. App. 2006); Va. Att’y
Gen. Op. No. 006-003, 2006 WL 4286442 (2006); Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 200729, 2007 WL 2689931 (2007); Mich. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2005-7171, 2005 WL
639112 (2005).
16. The Louisiana DOMA was passed on September 18, 2004 as Act number
926. 2004 La. Acts 2878.
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restrictions upon private contracts between such couples.17 Those
contractual restrictions were repealed over 20 years ago, revealing a
movement toward a more liberal public policy concerning the rights
of cohabitants, consistent with changing social attitudes about such
relationships.18 The Louisiana DOMA, adopted primarily in an
effort to strengthen the ban on same-sex marriage in the state,
impedes this movement with a blanket restriction on the contractual
rights of cohabitants. Consequently, legal experts are questioning
the direction of the state’s current policy toward cohabitants.19 This
Comment answers those questions and others by providing muchneeded clarity concerning the scope of the Louisiana DOMA.
This Comment will proceed in four parts. Part I profiles state
DOMAs nationwide and offers a glimpse of several states’
determinations of the effect of those laws on the rights of
cohabitants. Part II discusses the liberalization of the public policy
toward cohabitants in Louisiana. Part III shows how the Louisiana
DOMA is an improper impediment to the development of this
policy. Part IV concludes with a recommendation that the legislature
change the Louisiana DOMA to address only same-sex marriage.
This change is necessary because the Louisiana DOMA’s
restrictions are inconsistent with the direction of state public policy,
ineffective as a tool to promote marriage, and, as part of the state
constitution, far too burdensome to change in order to maintain
consistency with contemporary social norms.
I. THE FIGHT FOR ANSWERS ACROSS THE COUNTRY: DETERMINING
THE EFFECT OF STATE DOMAS UPON COHABITANTS
Called to action by state supreme courts that viewed legislative
bans of same-sex marriage as violative of their state constitutions,
many state legislatures adopted constitutional amendments declaring
same-sex marriage unconstitutional.20 Although the amendments
were created to prevent a state supreme court from granting samesex couples the right to marry, many of the amendments also
17. KATHERINE S. SPAHT & RICHARD D. MORENO, MATRIMONIAL REGIMES, §
8.3 in 15 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 771 (3d ed. 2010).
18. See generally Catherine Augusta Mills, Comment, Implications of the
Repeal of Louisiana Civil Code Article 1481, 48 LA. L. REV. 1201, 1215 (1988).
19. SPAHT & MORENO, supra note 17, at 771.
20. See supra note 13.
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address the rights of opposite-sex couples. In many of these states,
the public grew concerned over whether the language of these
amendments could potentially affect private contracts.
A. State Supreme Court Decisions Nullifying Legislative
Prohibitions of Same-Sex Marriage
Most states prevent same-sex couples from contracting to
marry.21 For example, Louisiana’s legislative protections of
marriage are found in the Civil Code. Louisiana Civil Code article
86 defines marriage as “a legal relationship between a man and a
woman that is created by civil contract.”22 The first part of article 89
prohibits persons of the same sex from contracting marriage with
each other.23 The second part of that article implements article 3520
to govern same-sex marriages contracted in other states:24 “A
purported marriage between persons of the same sex violates a
strong public policy of the state of Louisiana and such a marriage
contracted in another state shall not be recognized in this state for
any purpose . . .”25 Any marriage contracted in violation of an
impediment, such as the impediment of same sex, is considered
absolutely null under Louisiana law, voiding any legal effect of the
marriage from the moment of its creation.26 Furthermore, “a
purported marriage between parties of the same sex does not
produce any civil effects.”27
21. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (Westlaw 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
741.212 (Westlaw 2011); IND. CODE § 31-11-1-1 (Westlaw 2011); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 517.01 (Westlaw 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1 (West 2007); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 451.022 (Westlaw 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-1.2 (Westlaw
2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 3.1 (Westlaw 2011); TEX FAM. CODE ANN. §
6.204 (West 2006).
22. LA. CIV. CODE art. 86 (2010).
23. LA. CIV. CODE art. 89 (2010).
24. LA. CIV. CODE art. 89 (2010) (“Persons of the same sex may not contract
marriage with each other. A purported marriage between persons of the same sex
contracted in another state shall be governed by the provisions of Title II of Book
IV of the Civil Code.”).
25. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3520 (2010).
26. LA. CIV. CODE art. 94 (2010) (“A marriage is absolutely null when
contracted without a marriage ceremony, by procuration, or in violation of an
impediment . . . .”); id. cmt. b.
27. LA. CIV. CODE. art. 96 (2010). The article allows for civil effects to
remain in the following situations: a) “in favor of a party who contracted for the
marriage in good faith for as long as that party remain in good faith;” b) “[w]hen
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State courts, however, found that these kinds of limitations on
same-sex marriage violated state constitutions.28 In 1993, the Hawaii
Supreme Court held in Baehr v. Lewin that there was no
fundamental right to same-sex marriage in Hawaii, but that a claim
for sex discrimination arising out of the denial of marriage rights
was subject to strict scrutiny.29 The court remanded the case, and in
1996, the Hawaii Supreme Court held the state had not met its
burden of showing a compelling interest for the discrimination and
therefore found that the Hawaii statute limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples violated the Hawaii Constitution.30
Similarly, in 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court held in Baker v.
State that the Vermont Constitution required the benefits of
marriage be extended to same-sex couples.31 In that case, same-sex
couples claimed the legislation that denied them marriage licenses
violated the state constitution.32 The court allowed the existing
legislation to remain in effect while the legislature drafted new laws
in accordance with the order.33 In response to the court’s ruling, the
Vermont Legislature created a new legal relationship—the civil
union for same-sex partners, carrying with it all the legal incidents
and benefits of marriage.34 Commentators on both ends of the
marriage debate described the unions as “‘same-sex marriage by
another name,’ or ‘marriage lite’ . . . .”35 Thus, they argued that “the

the cause of the nullity is one party’s prior undissolved marriage, the civil effects
continue in favor of the other party, regardless of whether the [other party]
remains in good faith, until the marriage is pronounced null or the latter party
contracts a valid marriage;” and c) “a marriage contracted by a party in good faith
produces civil effects in favor of a child of the parties.”
28. See Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003);
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.
1993).
29. Baehr, 852 P.2d 44.
30. Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996), aff’d, Baehr v. Miike, 950
P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997). In 1998, Hawaii passed a constitutional amendment,
article I § 23, granting the legislature the right to reserve marriage for opposite-sex
couples.
31. Baker, 744 A.2d 864.
32. Id. at 867–68.
33. Id. at 887.
34. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (Westlaw 2011).
35. Joshua K. Baker, Status, Substance, and Structure: An Interpretive
Framework for Understanding the State Marriage Amendments, 17 REGENT U. L.
REV. 221, 229 (2004–2005).
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[Vermont legislature] maintained a nominal distinction between
civil unions and marriage.”36
Four years later, the Massachusetts Supreme Court went a step
further than Baker in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.37
Partially relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v.
Texas,38 and expanding on the decision of the Vermont Supreme
Court in Baker, the court re-wrote the Massachusetts definition of
marriage as “the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the
exclusion of all others.”39 The court later issued an opinion to the
state senate which said that drafting a statute establishing civil
unions similar to those in Vermont while still denying marriage
rights to same-sex couples would “maintain[] an unconstitutional,
inferior and discriminatory status for same-sex couples.”40
Many state legislatures became wary of cases like Goodridge
and Baker and took measures to prevent such decisions from
occurring in their respective states. To combat what they feared
would be a growing trend in state courts, the legislatures proposed
amendments to their state constitutions that would ban same-sex
marriage. The general electorate subsequently adopted these
amendments.
B. State DOMAs Make Same-Sex Marriage Unconstitutional
In 2000, Nebraska spearheaded the movement against the
judicial expansion of marriage rights by becoming the first state to
amend its constitution to recognize marriage as the union of only
one man and one woman.41 The amendment also went beyond
marriage, declaring invalid “[t]he uniting of two persons of the same
sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex
relationship.”42 Supporters of the amendment called it “a response to
36. Id.
37. Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
38. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
39. Richard Cook, Kansas’s Defense of Marriage Amendment: The
Problematic Consequences of a Blanket Nonrecognition Rule on Kansas Law, 54
U. KAN. L. REV. 1165, 1170 (2006) (quoting Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d. at 969).
40. Jason Montgomery, An Examination of Same-Sex Marriage and the
Ramifications of Lawrence v. Texas, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 687, 696 (2005)
(citing Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 440 Mass. 1201, 1206–07 (2004)).
41. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (Westlaw 2011).
42. Id.
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a court decision last year in Vermont [Baker] that stopped short of
legalizing gay marriage but held that gay couples were entitled to
the same benefits as heterosexual ones.”43 Opponents attacked the
amendment on many grounds, including the potential for
unintended, even harmful, restrictions on certain private agreements
between same-sex couples.44 Having withstood a constitutional
challenge that proceeded all the way to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the amendment still stands today.45
Other states were hesitant to follow Nebraska’s response to
Baker,46 but they quickly reacted to the Massachusetts Supreme
Court’s official recognition of same-sex marriage rights in
Goodridge.47 To date, 30 states have amended their constitutions to
prohibit same-sex marriage.48 Twenty-three of these amendments
were passed in the election cycle immediately following the
Goodridge decision, and three more were passed in 2008.49
Some of these states found it necessary not only to prohibit
same-sex marriage but also to preclude any couple from creating a
legal relationship with each other intended to replicate marriage.
Fifteen state DOMAs, including Louisiana’s, not only prohibit
same-sex marriage, but also limit the rights of cohabitants.50
43. Pam Belluck, Nebraskans to Vote on Most Sweeping Ban on Gay Unions,
N.Y. TIMES, October 21, 2000, at A9. In her article, Belluck quotes Dan Parsons,
the spokesman for the Nebraska Coalition for the Protection of Marriage, as
saying, “Because of the action in Vermont, we really feel we’ve been forced to
adopt this language to close this loophole.” Id.
44. Id. M.J. McBride, a campaign coordinator for Nebraskans Against 416,
said, “My binding contracts, my power of attorney, wills and medical directives
will be viewed as contracts or partnerships between two people of the same sex
and no longer be recognized or valid in the state of Nebraska.” Id.
45. Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb.
2005), rev’d, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006).
46. Only Nevada joined Nebraska in passing a constitutional amendment
prior to Goodridge. Proposed in 2000, Article I, section 21 of the Nevada
Constitution passed in 2002 because of a state law requiring voters to approve the
amendment in two consecutive general elections. The amendment reads, “Only a
marriage between a male and female person shall be recognized and given effect
in this state.” NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21 (Westlaw 2011).
47. Because Goodridge recognized same-sex couples’ right to marriage, and
not their right to a marriage alternative like Baker, states were quicker to respond
to what they perceived to be a direct attack on the institution of marriage itself.
48. See supra note 13 (listing state DOMAs).
49. In 2004, 13 amendments were passed. In 2005, two were passed. In 2006,
eight were passed.
50. See supra note 15 (lisiting state DOMAs that address opposite sex
couples).
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Although the bulk of the national debate surrounding state DOMAs
has focused on the ban of same-sex marriage, the language of this
particular group of DOMAs raises important questions regarding the
rights of cohabitants. A lack of clarity arises, specifically, through
“legal status” clauses such as the Louisiana DOMA clause, which
states, “A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of
marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or
recognized.”51 In several of these states, state courts or attorneys
general have been compelled to offer analyses of whether the state
DOMAs affect private contracts.
C. Determining the Effects of State DOMAs
Each of the states to address the effect of the state DOMA on the
rights of cohabitants has come to a similar result. However, the
opinions from the state courts and attorneys general vary as to both
the reasoning and directness.
1. Clear Interpretations of the State DOMA
Virginia, Kansas, and Texas have provided a clear and direct
analysis of their state DOMA through opinions from state courts or
attorneys general.52 All such opinions held that the effects of the
state DOMA were limited to state action.
a. Virginia’s Clear-Cut Decision: There is No Effect
The Virginia DOMA prohibits the creation of a legal status with
effects similar to marriage regardless of any romantic relationship
between the parties. The amendment says, in pertinent part,
“[Virginia] and its political subdivisions shall not create or
recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals
that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance, or
effects of marriage.”53 Prior to the passage of the amendment, the
Virginia Attorney General issued an opinion stating, without
51. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (Supp. 2011).
52. See Ross v. Goldstein, 203 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. App. 14th Dis. 2006); Va.
Att’y Gen. Op. No. 06-003, 2006 WL 4286442 (2006); Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. 200729, 2007 WL 2689931 (2007).
53. VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A (Westlaw 2011).

798

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

equivocation, that the amendment would not affect private
contracts.54 In particular, the opinion states that the amendment
would not affect the legal rights of unmarried persons involving
various types of private contracts and agreements. Nor would it
“alter any other rights that do not ‘approximate the design, qualities,
significance, or effects of marriage’” or create the rights or effects of
marriage.55 The attorney general noted further that these rights do
not arise from marriage and are therefore unaffected by the
enactment of the marriage amendment.56 The attorney general then
issued a sweeping statement designed to inspire certainty regarding
the private contractual rights of persons in Virginia following the
passage of the marriage amendment: “Any Virginian, subject to any
other existing legal limitations, may enter into any lawful contract,
dispose of property to any person of his choosing by will or deed, or
appoint any person to act on his behalf pursuant to a power of
attorney or advance medical directive.”57 Following the attorney
general’s clear and strong opinion, no litigation or other legal
challenges concerning the Virginia DOMA have arisen.
b. Kansas Relies on Legislative Intent to Declare No Effect
The relevant part of the Kansas DOMA, subsection (b), reads as
follows: “No relationship, other than a marriage, shall be recognized
by the state as entitling the parties to the rights or incidents of
marriage.”58 Although the amendment does not employ language
referring specifically to legal status, the Kansas Attorney General
was asked to address whether the amendment affected private
insurance contracts.59 In his opinion, the Kansas Attorney General
looked to the legislature’s intent when it drafted the amendment and
determined there was no such effect.60 State Representative Jan
Pauls said private employers could voluntarily offer insurance
benefits to “non-marital couples.”61 Representative Pauls also
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Va. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 06-003, 2006 WL 4286442.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 3.
KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16 (Westlaw 2011).
Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2007-29, 2007 WL 2689931 (2007).
Id. at 2.
Id.
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insisted the amendment would not “remove any rights that a Kansas
citizen currently holds.”62 The attorney general’s opinion also
includes the testimony of Professor Kris Kobach,63 who said that
subsection (b) of the amendment applied only to rights and incidents
of marriage given by the state and did not limit contractual or legal
agreements between private parties.64 Professor Kobach then
explained his view in further detail:
In other words, private contracts that offer benefits similar to
those offered to married couples are in no way prohibited by
[the Marriage Amendment]. . . . When such a private
contract is made, it does not constitute “recognition by the
state.” The state has not acted in any way. [A] right or
incident of marriage is something that is automatically
triggered when a marriage exists. It is something that has
been positively identified by statute or court decision . . .
contractual or private legal arrangements are not “rights or
incidents of marriage,” because they do not come into
existence automatically under state law as soon as a
marriage exists.65
c. Texas Court’s Alternative Approach
The Texas DOMA reads in relevant part, “This state or a
political subdivision of this state may not create or recognize any
legal status identical or similar to marriage.”66 In Ross v. Goldstein,
a Texas appellate court addressed an issue arising out of the intestate
succession of John David Green.67 The court rejected a claim by
Ross, Green’s same-sex partner, for recognition of a “marriage-like
relationship” between the two men that would entitle Ross to a
portion of Green’s property in the succession.68 The court reasoned
that Texas’s DOMA mandated a denial of the claim because public
policy was “unambiguous, clear, and controlling on the question of
62. Id. (It is only logical to assume that when Rep. Pauls refers to “any right,”
she is including the freedom to privately contract and order one’s affairs.).
63. Prof. Kris Kobach is the Daniel L. Brenner/UMKC Scholar and Professor
of Law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. He has taught at
UMKC since 1996.
64. Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2007-29, 2007 WL 2689931, 3.
65. Id.
66. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32 (Westlaw 2011).
67. Ross v. Goldstein, 203 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. App. 2006).
68. Id. at 514.
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creating a new equitable remedy akin to marriage: [a court] may not
create such a remedy.”69 The court stated further, “Texas has
determined that same-sex couples must address their particular
desires through other legal vehicles such as contracts or
testamentary transfers.”70 Through this statement, the court thus
recognized a freedom for private parties to contractually arrange
their affairs.
The court’s less-direct analysis has more to do with the issue
brought before it than its interpretation of the amendment. Because
the appellant argued only the issue of whether the court could
establish a “marriage-like relationship” for same-sex couples,71 the
court addressed only this issue. The court was not required to give
the type of clear and definite statement given in both Kansas and
Virginia as to the precise limits of the state DOMA. Although the
court in Ross did not expressly address any potential effects on
private contracts, it assumes there are none through its determination
that same-sex couples can always address their concerns through
private contracts.72 If same-sex couples in Texas can turn to
contracts instead of a “marriage-like relationship” to order their
affairs, it follows that opposite-sex couples can do the same.
d. Michigan’s Application of General Constitutional Principles
Unlike Virginia, Kansas, and Texas, legal authorities in
Michigan used general principles of the Michigan Constitution,
rather than a specific interpretation of the state DOMA itself, to find
that Michigan’s DOMA did not affect private contracts.
The Michigan DOMA reads in pertinent part, “[T]he union of
one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement
69. Id.
70. Id. The court parenthetically refers to a Texas House of Representatives
Joint Resolution, which says:
This state recognizes that through the designation of guardians, the
appointment of agents, and the use of private contracts, persons may
adequately and properly appoint guardians and arrange rights relating to
hospital visitation, property, and the entitlement to proceeds of life
insurance policies without the existence of any legal status identical or
similar to marriage.
Id. (quoting Tex. H.R.J. Res. 6, § 2, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005)).
71. Ross, 203 S.W.3d at 512.
72. Id. at 514.
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recognized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose.”73 This
amendment uses the broadest language of all in prohibiting
relationships similar to marriage under law.74 The amendment lacks
any reference to same-sex or opposite-sex couples and bans any
recognition of a marriage-like relationship “for any purpose.”75
In National Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Michigan, the
Michigan Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the state
DOMA prevented public employers from providing their employees
with health insurance benefits for their domestic partners.76 The
court held public employers could not provide such benefits since
domestic partnerships were similar to marriage “because [they] are
the only relationships in Michigan defined in terms of both gender
and lack of a close blood connection.”77 Because public employers
were an arm of the state and domestic partnerships were a
relationship similar to marriage, the court concluded that the
recognition of such benefits, and therefore the domestic partnership
status, violated Michigan’s DOMA.78 In a footnote, the court
specifically declined to address “whether private employers can
provide health-insurance benefits to their employees’ same-sex
domestic partners.”79
Twenty years prior to National Pride, the court in Woodland v.
Michigan Citizens Lobby provided a clear interpretation of the
Michigan Constitution–specifically whether the relevant provisions
applied to private conduct.80 In Woodland, the court held that the
Declaration of Rights of the Michigan Constitution81 had “never
been interpreted as extending to purely private conduct; these
provisions have consistently been interpreted as limited to protection
against state action.”82 In a 2005 interpretation of the state’s DOMA,
the Michigan Attorney General used the court’s opinion in
73. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25 (Westlaw 2011).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 2008).
77. Id. at 536. Note that in this case, domestic partnerships only involved
persons of the same gender. Id. at 531.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 544 n.1.
80. 378 N.W.2d 337 (Mich. 1985).
81. The Declaration of Rights is Article I of the Michigan Constitution and
contains the Michigan DOMA at section 25.
82. Woodland, 378 N.W.2d at 344.
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Woodland to find that the amendment operates “as a limitation on
government conduct and therefore applies to state and local
government entities.”83
Unlike Texas, Kansas, and Virginia, the interpretations of the
Michigan DOMA do not expressly address the amendments
application to private contracts. Rather, through a clear
interpretation of the general principles of the Michigan Constitution,
one can infer that the amendment would not apply to any private
conduct whatsoever.
The aforementioned state interpretations of DOMAs around the
nation show that state DOMAs are strong indicia of state policy
toward the rights of cohabitants. Based on a variety of reasons, each
interpretation found the state DOMA does not affect private
contracts. The legal history of Louisiana provides a different
scenario from the above mentioned states, and interpretation of the
Louisiana DOMA could therefore be decidedly different.
D. Shifting the Focus Back Home: The Adoption of the Louisiana
DOMA
Legal authorities in Louisiana face an issue that none of the
aforementioned states had to resolve when deciphering the intent of
the drafters of the state DOMA and determining the law’s effects:
Louisiana’s history of legislative restrictions upon contracts between
cohabitants. The Louisiana DOMA, adopted in September 2004,
states:
Marriage in the state of Louisiana shall consist only of the
union of one man and one woman. No official or court of the
state of Louisiana shall construe this constitution or any state
law to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be
conferred upon any member of a union other than the union
of one man and one woman. A legal status identical or
substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried
individuals shall not be valid or recognized. No official or
court of the state of Louisiana shall recognize any marriage

83. Mich. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 005-7171, 2005 WL 639112, 4 (2005).
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contracted in any other jurisdiction which is not the union of
one man and one woman.84
Prior to its passage, the state legislature debated several key
issues arising from the language of the amendment.85 One major
area of controversy was the proposed amendment’s potential impact
on private contracts, including domestic agreements between
cohabitants and domestic partner benefits private companies offer in
contracts with their employees.86 Legal analysts were split on the
potential impact of the amendment on these contracts.87 Specifically,
the opposing sides disagreed as to what effect, if any, the Louisiana
DOMA would have upon private contracts between cohabitants.88
As the Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana noted in
materials disseminated to voters in advance of the DOMA vote,
Some legal scholars believe the amendment will not disturb
private contracts . . . . Other legal experts think private
contracts closely paralleling marital rights may be nullified
such as alimony and health-care benefits. Others think the
amendment would invalidate all agreements between samesex and unmarried opposite-sex partners, even those that are
not marital in nature, such as medical directives.89
Although Louisiana courts came close to resolving the dispute
among the legislators, no answer has been provided yet, and the
issue remains unresolved.90
84. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (emphasis added).
85. Guide to the Constitutional Amendment on the Defense of Marriage Act,
STUD. & REP. BY DATE (Pub. Affairs Research Council of La.), Aug. 2004, at 3,
available at http://www.la-par.org/studrepdate.cfm.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 4. The amendment also withstood a judicial challenge prior to its
adoption in Forum for Equality PAC v. McKeithen, 893 So. 2d 715 (La. 2005), on
the grounds that it contained more than one object, violating the single-object rule
of the Louisiana Constitution contained in Article XIII, section 1 (B). See Forum
for Equality PAC, 893 So. 2d at 729, for an explanation of the single-object rule.
The Louisiana Supreme Court eventually found that the DOMA had as its sole
object “the defense and protection of our civil tradition of marriage.” Forum for
Equality PAC, 893 So. 2d at 734.
90. After its adoption, the Louisiana DOMA was an issue in only one case,
Ralph v. City of New Orleans, 4 So. 3d 146 (La. App. Ct. 4th 2009). The case
involved a taxpayer suit seeking a declaration that the city of New Orleans and the
City Council had acted beyond their powers when they provided for the registry of
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD COHABITANTS IN
LOUISIANA
Louisiana law governing the rights of cohabitants has undergone
a gradual change coinciding with the contemporary cultural
practices and attitudes of Louisiana citizens. The evolution of these
laws is evident in the changes made to the Civil Code and the
Revised Statutes. An examination of the changes to the Code
articles and criminal statutes governing the rights of cohabitants
exposes how the Louisiana DOMA undermines social policy.
A. The Era of Louisiana Civil Code Article 1481 and its Restrictions
on the Rights of Cohabitants
Only Louisiana and South Carolina have passed a statute
restricting “donations between persons living in concubinage, or
otherwise sustaining immoral relations.”91 The restrictions under the
Louisiana Civil Code were much broader than those in South
Carolina, limiting donations between anyone living in “open
concubinage.”92 None of the versions of the Civil Code defined
“open concubinage.” According to the Louisiana Supreme Court,
concubinage can be defined as “the act or practice of cohabiting
without legal marriage.”93 In other words, concubinage is a

domestic partnerships, and then used the registry as the basis for extending health
insurance coverage and benefits to the unmarried “domestic partners” of city
employees. Ralph, 4 So. 3d at 148. One of the issues brought to the court rings a
familiar tune—whether the health insurance benefits for domestic partners
violated the Louisiana DOMA’s prohibition of “[a] legal status identical or
substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals . . . .” Id. at 158.
The court, however, dismissed any consideration of this issue on procedural
grounds, holding that the claim was not before it because it was not raised in the
pleadings. Id.
91. Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statutes Discountenancing
Donations, Testamentary or Otherwise, Between Persons Living in Concubinage
or Otherwise Sustaining Immoral Relations, 62 A.L.R. 286 (2010). The South
Carolina statute, passed in the Act of 1795 and later incorporated into the general
statutes, limited only a lawfully married man from giving more than one-fourth of
the value of his estate to a woman with whom he lived in adultery. The statute is
almost entirely obsolete, however, and has not been litigated since 1899. See
Beaty v. Richardson, 34 S.E. 73 (S.C. 1899).
92. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1481 (1870).
93. Succession of Jahraus, 38 So. 417, 459 (La. 1905).
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relatively stable relationship that requires living together as man and
wife without being married.94 Concubinage is open when the
relationship is not “disguised, concealed or made secret by the
parties.”95 In Succession of Bacot, the court defined a concubine as
“one who occupies the position, performs the duties, and assumes
the responsibilities of a wife, without the title and privileges flowing
from a legal marriage.”96 A paramour is simply a man with whom a
concubine lives.97
Prior to its repeal, Louisiana Civil Code Article 1481 provided
the foundation for contractual restrictions upon those living in open
concubinage in Louisiana.98 At first, the article completely
prohibited donations of immovables and donations of movables in
excess of certain pecuniary limitations.99
The history and eventual repeal of article 1481 and its
restrictions upon donations between persons living in open
concubinage reveals a gradual change to a more liberal and open
public policy toward cohabitants in Louisiana.100 During the Roman
Empire, concubinage was widely recognized as an inferior or
secondary status to marriage and was afforded only certain types of
legal recognition.101 The Roman concubine never acquired the social
or legal status of her male partner.102 Under early French law,
concubines and paramours were completely prohibited from making

94. Lorio, supra note 10, at 13 (quoting Succession of Jahraus, 114 La. 456,
458 (1905)).
95. Succession of Green v. Mears, 499 So. 2d 637, 638 (La. Ct. App. 3d
1986).
96. 502 So. 2d 1118, 1127 (La. 1987) (quoting Purvis v. Purvis, 162 So. 2d
239, 240 (La. Ct. App. 1935)).
97. Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316, 323 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
98. The article was repealed by the Louisiana legislature in Act 468 of 1987.
Act. No. 468, 1987 La. Acts 1149.
99. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1481 (1870):
Those who have lived together in open concubinage are respectively
incapable of making to each other, whether inter vivos or mortis causa,
any donation of immovables; and if they make a donation of movables, it
can not exceed one-tenth part of the whole value of their estate.
Those who afterwards marry are excepted from this rule.
100. Mills, supra note 18, at 1215.
101. Bacot, 502 So. 2d at 1127–28.
102. Bacot, 502 So. 2d at 1128 (citing Lorio, supra note 10, at 5).
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donations to each other.103 The versions of article 1481 in the early
Louisiana Civil Codes also forbade all donations between those
living in open concubinage, but in 1825 the article was amended to
read as follows until it was repealed in 1987:104
Those who have lived together in open concubinage are
respectively incapable of making to each other, whether
inter vivos or mortis causa, any donation of immovables;
and if they make a donation of movables, it can not exceed
one-tenth part of the whole value of their estate.
Those who afterwards marry are excepted from this rule.105
The jurisprudence that interpreted article 1481 reveals the
evolution of Louisiana’s public policy toward cohabitants.106
The first version of the article forbade all donations between
concubine and paramour. In 1825 the article was modified to allow a
donation of ten percent of one’s estate, and the legislature made an
exception for couples that later married.107 The 1825 version of
article 1481 lasted nearly 50 years, when the reasons for its
application began to change.108 Originally, the article was used to
discourage illicit liaisons, especially between white men and their
slaves.109 Over time, article 1481 was used to condemn concubinage
as immoral and to show that such relationships were unacceptable to
society.110 As more people began living together outside of wedlock,
article 1481 morphed into a vehicle to promote the institution of
marriage and discourage concubinage.111 This is especially evident
in light of the fact that, if two people living in open concubinage
were to later marry one another, they would be completely exempt
from any of the limitations of article 1481, both before and after
marriage.112 However, one scholar pointed out that “penalizing
103. Lorio, supra note 10, at 12 n.61 (quoting the ancient French law which
prohibited all donations between concubines in Royal Ordinance, Code Michaud
de janvier 1629, art. 12).
104. Mills, supra note 18, at 1215.
105. LA. CIV. CODE. art. 1481 (1870).
106. Mills, supra note 18, at 1216.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. Mills offers an interesting perspective on the use of concubinage in the
Civil War era to protect legitimate forced heirs from losing their inheritance rights
to slaves and to prevent an increase in the free black population in the South. See
Id. at 1216 n.78.
110. Id. at 1216.
111. Id. at 1216–17.
112. Lorio, supra note 10, at 20; see also Mills, supra note 18, at 1206.
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those who [chose] concubinage over marriage [did] not significantly
[promote] the latter institution at the expense of the former.”113 An
examination of how article 1481 has applied to insurance policies
provides a more in-depth view of the changes in the law over the last
century.
1. Article 1481 and Insurance Policies
In 1905, the Louisiana Supreme Court in New York Life
Insurance Co. v. Neal allowed a concubine, as a named beneficiary
on a life insurance policy, to recover only one-tenth of the total
proceeds of the policy.114 The court classified the proceeds of the
policy as a donation of a movable subject to reduction under article
1481.115 In 1930, the Supreme Court overruled Neal in Sizeler v.
Sizeler and declared article 1481 inapplicable to life insurance
proceeds, allowing the concubine to recover the whole amount of
the proceeds.116 Although the Court in Sizeler found that life
insurance policies were not governed by rules applicable to
donations, such as article 1481, it also set a precedent for the
supremacy of freedom of contract when it allowed a paramour living
in open concubinage to enter into a particular type of contract for the
benefit of the concubine.117
More than 50 years later, in Woodmen of the World Life
Insurance Society v. Leblanc, a Louisiana circuit court held a man
could change the named beneficiary on his private life insurance
policy from his wife and their two minor children to his
concubine.118 The court held, “It was not for the trial judge then, nor
is it for us now, to pass judgment on the decedent for his decision to
change beneficiaries”.119 As one commenter noted, “With respect to
Louisiana’s law on concubinage, this statement succinctly
acknowledges the trend away from imposing upon individuals,
through assertions of public policy, a sense of morality that is not
shared by all.”120
2. The Repeal of Article 1481 and its Implications

113. Lorio, supra note 10, at 23.
114. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Neal, 38 So. 485, 485 (La. 1905).
115. Id. at 486.
116. Sizeler v. Sizeler, 127 So. 388, 389 (La. 1930).
117. Mills, supra note 18, at 1207–08.
118. Mills, supra note 18, at 1208 (citing Woodmen of the World Life
Insurance Society v. LeBlanc, 417 So. 2d 886 (La. Ct. App. 1982)).
119. Woodmen of the World, 417 So. 2d at 888.
120. Mills, supra note 18, at 1208.

808

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

The 1987 repeal of article 1481 marked the culmination of a
gradual trend away from the imposition of a non-universal morality
upon individuals living in open concubinage in Louisiana. The
repeal also showed, at least prior to the passage of the Louisiana
DOMA, that donations between cohabitants no longer violated
public policy.
When it repealed article 1481, the legislature also rejected a
proposed article 101, which read as follows: “[a]n otherwise valid
contract is not rendered unenforceable solely because the parties,
neither of whom was married, were cohabitants at the time of
contracting, but such a contract must be in writing.”121 This
concurrent repeal and rejection are strong indicia of state policy
towards cohabitants in the late 1980s.
The repeal of 1481 indicated that donations between cohabitants
were no longer against public policy.122 However, the rejection of
article 101 shows the legislature was not ready to allow all contracts
between cohabitants.123 These dual legislative acts show a desire to
loosen the restrictions on the ability of cohabitants to privately
contract with one another while concomitantly ensuring that such
freedoms are not absolute. More importantly, the acts show how
Louisiana law has evolved in tandem with societal norms; as the
number of unwed cohabitants increased and social acceptance grew,
the law changed to offer cohabitants greater freedom to order their
affairs.
3. Looking at What’s LeftThe Status of Concubinage Under
Current Louisiana Law
Since the repeal of article 1481, Louisiana law continues to
recognize concubinage as a legal status. In the Louisiana Code of
Evidence, a concubinage relationship is used as a prerequisite for
certain exceptions to the inadmissibility of character evidence.124
121. H.B. 1139, § 1, art. 101, 1987 La. Reg. Sess.
122. Mills, supra note 18, at 1228.
123. Id. As Mills notes in her comment, there is still room for those contracts
that are otherwise enforceable so long as they do not violate public policy. Article
1968 of the Louisiana Civil Code declares any contracts that violate public policy
absolutely null for an unlawful cause. The article says, “The cause of an obligation
is unlawful when the enforcement of the obligation would produce a result
prohibited by law or against public policy.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 1968.
124. LA. CODE EVIDENCE art. 404 (2009). Article 404 (A)(2) says:
(2) Character of victim. (a) Except as provided in Article 412, evidence
of a pertinent trait of character, such as a moral quality, of the victim of
the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
character evidence; provided that in the absence of evidence of a hostile
demonstration or an overt act on the part of the victim at the time of the
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Under Louisiana Revised Statute 9:344 (B), grandparents of a minor
child can obtain visitation rights if the parent has died or is
incarcerated and lived in concubinage with the other parent.125 Thus,
while concubinage is not relevant to contractual freedom as it was
during the era of article 1481, the legal status of concubinage still
exists in modern Louisiana law.126 Concubinage (or cohabitation)
was, at one time, evidence of a crime in Louisiana, as well.
B. Cohabitation as Evidence of a Crime in Louisiana
Unmarried cohabitants were once subject to criminal
prosecution in Louisiana.127 From 1960 to 1975, entering into a
common law marriage in Louisiana was a crime, punishable by a
fine of up to $1,000, one-year imprisonment (with or without hard
labor), or both.128 The statute outlawing common-law marriage
provided: “The living together openly by a man and woman as man
and wife shall be considered as prima facie evidence that a common
law marriage has been entered into by them.”129 The statute was
repealed in 1975 in Act No. 638 of the Louisiana Legislature. The
purpose of that act clearly evinces legislative intent to maintain
consistency with cultural norms. Its goal was to
offense charged, evidence of his dangerous character is not admissible;
provided further that when the accused pleads self-defense and there is a
history of assaultive behavior between the victim and the accused and the
accused lived in a familial or intimate relationship such as, but not
limited to, the husband-wife, parent-child, or concubinage relationship, it
shall not be necessary to first show a hostile demonstration or overt act
on the part of the victim in order to introduce evidence of the dangerous
character of the victim, including specific instances of conduct and
domestic violence; and further provided that an expert’s opinion as to the
effects of the prior assaultive acts on the accused’s state of mind is
admissible . . . .
LA. CODE EVIDENCE art. 404(a)(2) (2009) (emphasis added).
125. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:344 (2009).
126. Following divorce, if a former spouse began living in open concubinage
with another person, it was grounds for terminating alimony or reducing the
amount of spousal support under former Louisiana Civil Code Article 112. That
provision was repealed in 2006, but some former spouses are still alleging that
living in open concubinage is grounds for terminating spousal support following
the dissolution of a marriage. See e.g., Greenland v. Greenland, 29 So. 3d 647 (La.
Ct. App. 2009); Ray v. Ray, 960 So. 2d 174 (La. Ct. App. 2007).
127. Mills, supra note 18, at 1213.
128. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:79.1 (1961), enacted by Act No. 73,
§ 1, 1960 La. Acts 240, 240–41, and repealed by Act No. 638, § 3, 1975 La. Acts
1395).
129. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:79.1 (1961), repealed by Act No. 638, § 3,
1975 La. Acts 1395.
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provide that it is the public policy of the state of Louisiana to
accord equal protection under the law of the state to all
citizens without regard to race, creed, color, or national
origin; to repeal laws inconsistent with this policy and to
permit the gathering of statistics on such bases provided they
are not used in contravention of this policy.130
This repeal reflects the evolution that began in 1930 with the life
insurance cases toward a more liberal public policy with respect to
cohabitants in Louisiana.131 As the repealing act shows, the
“religious overtones inherent in previous public policy were giving
way to more important concerns.”132
IV. THE LOUISIANA DOMA: AN IMPEDIMENT TO THE EVOLUTION OF
PUBLIC POLICY
The liberalization of the state’s public policy on the rights of
cohabitants and the new restrictions placed upon those rights by the
Louisiana DOMA are at odds. Some scholars have argued that the
policy espoused in the Louisiana DOMA marks a return to
traditional family values through the constitutional promotion of
marriage in the state.133 However, a stronger argument can be made
that the DOMA is not only inconsistent with the trending policy
toward cohabitants but is also an ineffective tool to promote
marriage and an overly burdensome restriction on the rights of
cohabitants.
A. The Louisiana DOMA is Inconsistent with the Trend in Public
Policy on the Rights of Cohabitants
Until the passage of the Louisiana DOMA, there was a clear
trend toward a more liberal policy with respect to cohabitants in
Louisiana.134 This trend accurately reflects society and everyday life
in Louisiana: more people are choosing not to marry, and more
people have begun to think of cohabitation as an acceptable way of
life.135 Both the legislation and jurisprudence in Louisiana have
130. Act No. 638, § 3, 1975 La. Acts 1395 (emphasis added).
131. Mills, supra note 18, at 1213.
132. Id.
133. See SPAHT & MORENO, supra note 17, at 771.
134. See generally Mills, supra note 18; Lorio, supra note 11; see also text
accompanying notes 102–145.
135. See Gallanis, supra note 1, at 58; Larry L. Bumpass & James A. Sweet,
Cohabitation, Marriage and Union Stability: Preliminary Findings from NSFH2 7
at tbl. 2 (Nat’l Survey of Families and Households, Working Paper No. 65, May
1995).
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evolved to a point where at least one commenter notes the “trend
away from imposing upon individuals, through assertions of public
policy, a sense of morality that is not shared by all.”136 Yet the
Louisiana DOMA may directly contradict this trend by placing a
blanket constitutional restriction upon the rights of cohabitants.137
This restriction, the effects of which remain uncertain, is a harbinger
of a possible return to imposing a non-universal morality upon
cohabitants. The language of the Louisiana DOMA restricting the
rights of cohabitants is therefore inconsistent with the evolution of
both the law and society in the state. Furthermore, the DOMA is an
inaccurate reflection of the contemporary public policy toward
cohabitants.
B. The Louisiana DOMA is an Ineffective Tool to Promote Marriage
The primary purpose of the Louisiana DOMA is to strengthen
the ban on same-sex marriage in Louisiana. Yet its drafters decided
to expand the statute’s scope beyond that goal, enveloping both
same- and opposite-sex couples with the language of the
amendment. The reason for doing so is a familiar one. The
Louisiana DOMA shows the drafters’ intent to focus on the state’s
interest in promoting marriage. And some have claimed that the
limitations placed on cohabitants “can be seen not so much as
punishing them for some kind of immorality, but a withholding of
benefits so as to encourage them toward a relationship that
ostensibly would be more stable.”138 This approach mirrors the one
courts used when applying article 1481 prior to its repeal.139 That
approach is problematic because promoting marriage by
discouraging cohabitation has not had the desired effect.140 With
cohabitation becoming a more acceptable cultural practice, it is hard
to see how any intended effect would be achieved through the
Louisiana DOMA and its similar approach to promoting marriage.

C. The Louisiana DOMA is too Procedurally Burdensome
Unlike Louisiana Civil Code article 1481 or Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 14:79.1 (criminalizing common law marriage), the
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Mills, supra note 18, at 1208.
LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15.
SPAHT & MORENO, supra note 17, at 771.
See Mills, supra note 18, at 1216–17.
Lorio, supra note 11, at 23.
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Louisiana DOMA is a constitutional amendment, which makes it a
far more permanent and stable statement of law and policy. This is
an overly burdensome method to declare a shift in public policy
toward cohabitants. Civil Code articles and revised statutes require
only the work of the legislature to change them, providing for a
more streamlined system that is better able to accurately reflect
contemporary social views.141 A constitutional amendment is
intended to reflect bedrock principles of state law, and the process
required to change the constitution is complex and difficult.142 In
order to pass a bill changing the Civil Code or the Revised
Statutes, a majority vote of both legislative houses is required.143 In
order to amend the Louisiana Constitution, a two-thirds vote of
both houses is required to bring the amendment to a vote by the
general electorate.144 A majority vote of the electorate is then
required to adopt the amendment.145 The difference in the number
of legislative bills passed compared to the number of constitutional
amendments adopted each year reflects the differences in
procedure and, ultimately, that constitutional principles hold a
more permanent spot in state law.146
Furthermore, the Louisiana DOMA incorporates a blanket
restriction upon the rights of cohabitants into the “fundamental law
upon which the structure of [Louisiana] government is
founded.”147 An attempt by a court to rule contrary to the
principles laid down in the Louisiana DOMA would pierce directly
to “the very heart of the stability of constitutional government.”148
Given the drastic changes in state policy toward cohabitants that
have occurred throughout the history of Louisiana, the reason for
creating such a permanent, inconsistent policy toward the rights of
cohabitants is dubious. The proper place to create such a policy, if
one exists at all, is through legislation, which more accurately
reflects current trends in state law.
V. CONCLUSION

141. LA. CONST. art. III, § 15.
142. See LA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
143. LA. CONST. art. III, § 15.
144. LA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
145. LA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
146. In 2010 alone, 12 constitutional amendments were proposed in Louisiana
(ten of which passed) as compared to hundreds of legislative bills. See Voters
Approve Majority of Constitutional Measures, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 2, 2010.
147. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Violet Trapping Co., 176 So. 2d 425,
447 (La. 1965) (Summers, J., dissenting).
148. Id.
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If the Louisiana DOMA is necessary, it should focus upon
strengthening the state’s ban on same-sex marriage. Venturing
beyond that purpose and restricting the rights of opposite-sex
couples is at odds with the public policy toward cohabitants in
Louisiana. The amendment should therefore be changed to eliminate
any reference to opposite-sex couples, and should instead focus
solely on the prohibition of same-sex marriage or a legal status
similar to marriage for persons of the same sex. Issues surrounding
the state’s ban on same-sex marriage are outside the scope of this
Comment, except to note the ban has been a legal constant in
Louisiana and the public policy behind it has not yet wavered. The
argument over whether prohibitions like this one should be placed in
a constitution is a passionate one. And it is rooted in the debate over
whether the right to same-sex marriage is provided for in the U.S.
Constitution. What is not debatable, however, is that Louisiana’s
policy toward cohabitants has changed drastically over time.
Louisiana is a unique state because of its signature blend of
history, culture, and people. Its civil law tradition sets it apart as
well. Uniqueness, however, does not warrant laws that are held
years behind the development of society. People across the country
and in Louisiana respect a couple’s choice to stay together without
marrying. Allowing the law to reflect this respect is the proper
course.
Randy J. Marse, Jr.
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